Sarah Sawyer



Much of my work is available to download on Academia.


Edited Collection

New Waves in Philosophy of Language, S. Sawyer (ed.) (New York: Palgrave Macmillan Press, 2010)

Refereed Journal Articles

‘Is There a Deductive Argument for Semantic Externalism? Reply to Yli-Vakkuri’, Analysis 2018, 78 (4): 675-681.

‘The Importance of Concepts’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 2018, 118 (2): 127-147.

‘Subjective Externalism’, Theoria 2018, 84:4-22.

‘Contrastivism and Anti-Individualism Part II: A Further Reply to Aikin and Dabay’, Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 2015, 4 (2): 10-12.

‘Minds and Morals’, Philosophical Issues, Extended Knowledge 2014, 24: 393-408.

‘Contrastivism and Anti-Individualism: A Response to Aikin and Dabay’, Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 2014, 3 (9): 1-6.

‘Contrastive Self-Knowledge’, Social Epistemology 2014, 28: 139-152.

‘Cognitivism: A New Theory of Singular Thought?’ Mind and Language 2012, 27 (3): 264-283.

‘The Role of Object-Dependent Content in Psychological Explanation’, Teorema: Special Issue Proceedings of the XIV University Workshop on Philosophy and Cognitive Science 2005.

‘The Epistemological Argument for Content Externalism’, Philosophical Perspectives, Epistemology 2005, 19: 257-280. Co-authored with Brad Majors.

‘Absences, Presences and Sufficient Conditions’, Analysis 2004, 64 (4): 354-357.

‘Conceptual Errors and Social Externalism', Philosophical Quarterly 2003, 53: 265-273.

‘Sufficient Absences', Analysis 2003, 63 (3): 202-208.

‘Abstract Artefacts in Pretence’, Philosophical Papers 2002, 31 (2): 183-198.

‘Rejecting Content Skepticism’, Southwest Philosophy Review 2002, 18 (2): 89-94.

‘In Defence of Burge's Thesis’, Philosophical Studies 2002, 107 (2): 109-128.

‘The Epistemic Divide’, The Southern Journal of Philosophy 2001, 39 (3): 385-401.

‘An Externalist Account of Introspective Knowledge', Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 1999, 80 (4): 358-378.

‘My Language Disquotes’, Analysis 1999, 59 (3): 206-211.

‘Privileged Access to the World’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 1998, 76 (4): 523-533.

Book Chapters in Edited Collections

‘Talk and Thought’, in Burgess, Cappelen and Plunkett (eds) Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).

‘The Importance of Fictional Properties’, in S. Brock & A. Everett (eds) Fictional Objects (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015): 208-229.

‘Contrastive Self-Knowledge and the McKinsey Paradox’, in S. Goldberg (ed.) Externalism and Skepticism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015): 75-93.

‘Social Anti-Individualism and the Mental’, in B. Kaldis, (ed.) Encyclopedia of Philosophy and the Social Sciences (SAGE Knowledge, 2013).

‘Empty Names’ in D. Graff Fara & G. Russell (eds) Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Language (London: Routledge, 2012): 153-162.

‘Internalism and Externalism in Mind’, in J. Garvey (ed.) The Continuum Companion to the Philosophy of Mind (London: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2011): 133-150.

Introduction to New Waves in Philosophy of Language S. Sawyer (ed.) (New York: Palgrave Macmillan Press, 2010): 1-7.

‘The Modified Predicate Theory of Proper Names’, in S. Sawyer (ed.) New Waves in Philosophy of Language (New York: Palgrave MacMillan Press, 2010): 206-225.

‘Entitlement, Opacity and Connection’ in S. Goldberg (ed.) Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007): 131-159. Co-authored with Brad Majors.

‘There is No Viable Notion of Narrow Content' in B. McLaughlin & J. Cohen (eds) Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 2007): 20-34.

‘Externalism, Apriority and Transmission of Warrant' in T. Marvan (ed.) What Determines Content? - the Internalism / Externalism Dispute (Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Press, 2006): 142-153.

Book Reviews

Review of Juhani Yli-Vakkuri and John Hawthorne, Narrow Content, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018). Mind, 2018, forthcoming.

Review of Jessica Brown, Anti-Individualism and Knowledge, (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2004). The Philosophical Quarterly, 2005, 55: 677-679.

Review of Jessica Brown, Anti-Individualism and Knowledge, (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2004). Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, January 2005.

Review of Kenneth M. Sayre, Belief and Knowledge: Mapping the Cognitive Landscape, (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc., 1997). Mind, 2001, 110: 546-549.

Review of André Gallois, The World Without, the Mind Within, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). Mind, 2000, 109: 595-598.

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